OPERATION RESTORE HOPE - SOMALIA

The United States Army, responding to a presidential directive, played a key role in a Joint/Combined operation to provide security and humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia. Our record in Operation RESTORE HOPE is an impressive testimony to the humanitarian vision of the Army's leaders and the dedication of its soldiers. To deploy a force great distances, build up a Coalition force in an area where none previously existed, and achieve our humanitarian objectives in a desolate theater required an extraordinary level of motivation, leadership and training.

On 3 Dec 92, the JCS issued a warning order to USCINCENT to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE, initiating direct U.S. intervention in Somalia. The National Command Authorities (NCA) assigned the mission and apportioned forces to CINCENT who formed a Joint Task Force (JTF) under the command of CG, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) with the CG, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) as COMARFOR. D-day occurred six days later as Marine forces conducted an amphibious assault in the vicinity of Mogadishu, and Army forces began deployment. At D+5, the JTF commander directed 13th COSCOM to establish a Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC).

Army involvement in this operation was small enough to focus on the operation as a case study in humanitarian assistance in an "operation other than war." It was also large enough (with transport distances long enough) to study the CONUS-based force projection strategy by straining the strategic mobility triad of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned materiel. Operation RESTORE HOPE, therefore, provides a vehicle to examine our ability to rapidly deploy CONUS-based forces to execute regional contingency requirements.

In many respects, Operation RESTORE HOPE represents a first for U.S. forces in fulfilling peace enforcement and peacekeeping roles while supporting UN humanitarian assistance efforts. The term "humanitarian assistance," as used here, however, does not fully explain the range of missions dictated by the unusual situation that existed in Somalia. With the absence of a legitimate government and due to the number of warring factions, military forces were involved in every aspect of the restoration of order from limited combat operations to political negotiations and reconstruction of the national infrastructure.

BACKGROUND:

Somalia's recent history is characterized by political unrest that culminated in civil war and the ousting of the government, followed by clan warfare and a total breakdown in government functions.

Since the toppling of the government in January 1991, 15 clans and sub-clans have vied for power, pitted against one another along tribal lines in a multifactional civil war. None of the clans has been successful in wresting control and the nation has drifted without a governing body for nearly two years. During this time, the country's infrastructure has deteriorated, rendered useless by looters and the destruction of war. Prior to U.S./UN intervention, organized government services, such as police, water, fire and electric departments, etc., at city and national levels, ceased to exist. The ability to supply food to the starving citizenry was negligible or nonexistent.

Somalia became an international basket case, dependent on external aid to survive. Clan families, unable to resolve the power issue, resorted to obstructing movement of relief supplies and extorting money from relief agencies as an extension of the internal power struggle.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS:

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established in April 1992, to provide a peacekeeping force to monitor a cease fire between the warring factions. Fifty unarmed observers arrived in early July 1992, concurrent with the start of UN relief shipments. (U.S. involvement also began around this time with Operation PROVIDE RELIEF by flying food shipments for non-governmental organizations (NGO) on military aircraft from Kenya to locations in southern Somalia).

In August 1992, the UN Security Council approved an increase in the strength of UNOSOM to four 750-man security units for the protection of humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. By late November, several nations agreed to provide observers, security personnel and logistics support forces. However, these early efforts proved largely ineffective as looting, extortion and running battles between clans continued. Relief supplies were regularly diverted away from distribution centers by thieves.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE:

It was against this backdrop that U.S. planning for the operation began in mid-November. Operation RESTORE HOPE was a four-phase operation that secured the area for humanitarian relief efforts and eventually returned control to UN forces. Phase I involved the deployment of forces to Somalia to secure the port and airfields in Mogadishu and Baledogle. In Phase II, the force expanded operations and provided security of humanitarian relief distribution sites and, in Phase III, forces expanded security operations into outlying areas. Phase IV, the handoff of theater functions and responsibilities to the UN, was officially completed 4 May 93.

Phase I. SECURE LODGEMENT AND ESTABLISH ARFOR (D-day to D+7; 9-16 Dec 92). Phase I began with an unopposed amphibious assault by Marine forces at Mogadishu. Two days later, the first Maritime Preposition Force ship arrived in port and began discharging. On D+3, the 10th MTN DIV command and control (C2) element arrived at Mogadishu and the initial combat force (A/2-87 IN) secured Baledogle. Phase I ended D+7 with Marine forces securing Baidoa.

Phase II. EXPAND SECURITY OPERATIONS OUT TO RELIEF DISTRIBUTION SITES (D+8 to D+19; 17-28 Dec 92) U.S. and Coalition forces secured major Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS). The ARFOR main body began deployment by air, rail and sea.

Phase III. EXPAND SECURITY OPERATIONS (D+20 to D+70; 29 Dec 92-17 Feb 93) Forces expanded their presence in each HRS and conducted operations to uncover and seize weapons caches. Security for NGO humanitarian relief efforts continued during this phase and continued through activation of UNOSOM II. Retrograde of U.S. forces also began in Phase III.

Phase IV TRANSITION TO UNITED NATIONS Transition to UNOSOM II began 18 Feb and was completed 4 May 93 (D+146) (when UNOSOM II's Operation CONTINUE HOPE began). The event-driven transition was completed when all necessary functions had been transferred.

URBAN OPERATIONAL ISSUES DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE US ARMY INVOLVEMENT IN UNOSOM II

UNITY OF COMMAND

UJTL: OP 5 Provide Operational Command and Control (C2)

ISSUE: Unity of Command was compromised during UNOSOM II.

DISCUSSION:

The principle of Unity of Command (FM 100-5, Operations) should be sustained in all U.S. Army formations, including support elements, during peace operations. Unity of Command permits the senior U.S. force commander to directly influence the planning, security preparations, and operational priorities of subordinate elements. It is the U.S. force commander who, ultimately, has the responsibility and combat power to provide force protection to U.S. forces operating in his area of responsibility.

-- Command and Control. The senior U.S. commander in theater should command all U.S. forces in theater or be fully "in the loop" in planning special operations for which he is expected to provide support, immediate reinforcement, or emergency extraction. To execute combat operations, the COMUSFOR needs a combat-capable staff to support his decision process in the event he has to commit his operational forces to combat on behalf of a strategic asset operating in his AO. Without a combat-capable staff, command decisions for impromptu combat actions are largely uninformed or are, essentially, instinctive or intuitive. The primary functions of leadership (planning and leading) are absent or unfulfilled. The burden of success is thrust upon the skills of the soldiers and small-unit leaders rather than shared with the functions of leadership. In effect, senior leadership is abdicated. The lesson is that U.S. soldiers deserve the best leadership (Unity of Command) the U.S. Army has to offer, even in peace operations. This is the ultimate Soldier Support issue (planning and leading: the imperatives of leadership). It is, arguably, the most important lesson to be derived from U.S. Army peace enforcement operations in UNOSOM II.

-- Combat-Capable Headquarters. In UNOSOM II, the commander of U.S. forces, Somalia (COMUSFORSOM), was also the deputy commander of UNOSOM II. However, as commander of U.S. forces, he did not have the combat-capable staff that a combatant commander would normally have to plan and execute combat operations (providing staff estimates and risk assessments). COMUSFORSOM also lacked the tactical radios necessary to lead and control combat actions. Our doctrine and leader development processes perpetuate the expectation that, in a combat environment, each higher headquarters is capable of planning and leading combat operations -- which can come at any time during peace enforcement operations. Since peace enforcement operations often require combat action, the combatant commander should have a combat-capable staff with which to plan and control combat actions into which he might have to commit his forces to protect any forces deployed to his area of responsibility. COMUSFORSOM also lacked combat-capable vehicles with which to perform as a battle captain.

-- Unity of Command for U.S. Contingency Forces. During the early portion of UNOSOM II (between August 1993 and October 1993), U.S. forces in Somalia were augmented by the introduction (26 August 1993) of a special operations element, TF Ranger, a strategic asset that reported to CENTCOM/JSOC rather than to the commander of U.S. forces in theater. The COMUSFORSOM was not a factor in planning or evaluating U.S. Ranger operations, even though he was ultimately responsible for reinforcing or extracting the Ranger force in a mission that developed into a significant combat action. A holistic approach to peace enforcement operations planning, incorporating the U.S. force commander's assessment of TF Ranger's plan and its supportability by theater U.S. forces, was missing. [Consequently, after the Ranger battle of 3-4 October 1993 went awry, it took several hours to develop an emergency extraction plan and convince Coalition forces (which had mechanized equipment) to participate and commit their assets to combat in support of the effort to extract the Ranger force.]

-- Task Organizing for Support. U.S. Army participation in Coalition operations should not necessarily mean that U.S. support elements will be assigned to a composite command, such as the UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC) in UNOSOM II. U.S. support elements in the UNLSC also were not under the control of a combat-capable, higher headquarters -- that is, a staff capable of planning, executing, and supporting combat operations or even designating defensible encampments for participating forces.

-- One U.S. Army forward support battalion was not under the control of the UNLSC. It was under the control of the Quick Reaction Force, a combat-capable headquarters. However, the mission of the QRF was to respond to direction from the COMUSFORSOM, who did not have the combat-capable staff, communications, and tactical vehicles needed to plan and lead combat operations. Without a combat-capable command structure, Unity of Command cannot be sustained when challenged or stressed by combat actions, even in a peace enforcement operation.

-- Positioning of Forces. Another aspect of disunity of the command climate during UNOSOM II involved the selection of terrain for positioning forces. Support bases Hunter and Sword were poorly situated on unfavorable urban terrain -- just a grenade throw from hostile territory. These support bases were difficult to defend. Victory Base, on the other hand, was situated away from built-up areas. It was defensible, with good fields of fire. The COMUSFOR should be able to influence or dictate the positioning of all U.S. elements for which he might have to provide force protection. He could take advantage of favorable ground and avoid indefensible or unfavorable terrain. However, he can do so only if Unity of Command is sustained at the tactical and operational levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Sustain Unity of Command in all U.S. Army formations during peace enforcement operations.

b. Deploy combat-capable commands to execute peace enforcement missions, including combat-capable staffs and forces adequately equipped with the combat power needed to defeat known capabilities of potentially belligerent forces.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

UJTL: ST.5.4.1 Issue Theater Strategic Operations Plans, Orders, and ROE.

During Operation RESTORE HOPE, JCS, and USCENTCOM ROE were carefully tailored to comply with operational and political concerns. Although more restrictive than wartime ROE, the fundamental premise of self-defense contained in the peacetime ROE did not change. The ROE clearly outlined the application of a graduated use of force to meet the levels of violence that characterized the environment.

ROE are, arguably, the most important aspect of conducting successful peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. The following lessons, or principles, are useful in developing ROE, conducting ROE-focused training, and applying ROE in actual situations:

PURPOSE: ROE must preclude indiscriminate use of deadly force while simultaneously allowing soldiers sufficient latitude to defend themselves. The fundamental premise of self-defense must be sustained. Soldiers must believe they can survive within the rules; ROE must meet their hierarchy of needs. Viewed in this context, ROE are soldier support factors as well as operational or tactical parameters.

DEVELOPMENT: ROE must be skillfully integrated into a combination of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian support operations, carefully tailored to comply with operational and political concerns.

MEASURED RESPONSE: ROE must incorporate criteria which clearly outline the application of a graduated use of force to provide the balance needed to defuse, escalate, or otherwise resolve any confrontation. The degree of force used to neutralize a threat should conform to the circumstances of an incident. Defining ROE in terms of graduated levels of response enables tactical elements to apply the force necessary to meet varying levels of violence that characterize peacekeeping and peace enforcement environments - while minimizing collateral damage.

DISSEMINATION: ROE must be published in writing, disseminated within the command, and thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers.

DISSEMINATION OF CHANGES: Changes to ROE must also be made in writing and quickly disseminated within the command. ROE are so important that command emphasis is needed to ensure that staff and subordinate commanders promptly disseminate changes to soldiers throughout the command.

FOCUSED TRAINING: In an environment where random shooting and sniping are prevalent or possible, only trained, disciplined soldiers are likely to exhibit the degree of restraint needed in operations other than war. Vignettes and situational training exercises, specifically focusing on ROE and led by NCOs, are essential in developing soldiers' skills on how to respond to a variety of situations, when to use deadly force, and when and how to apply non-deadly force.

FRONTLINE LEADERSHIP: When ROE are applied in actual situations, NCO leadership, experience, and maturity are always key factors in determining the appropriate response for the circumstances. Our experience in Somalia reaffirms the perennial lesson that good NCOs come from good soldiers and good soldiers come from good recruiting.

STANDARDIZATION WITHIN A COALITION: When a command is made up of coalition forces, application of ROE may vary based on the degree of emphasis placed on it by different coalition force commanders, variance in training among coalition forces, varying levels of experience by coalition forces in interacting with the local people, and differing interpretations of criteria outlining the graduated use of force. Senior coalition commanders must make a concerted effort to standardize interpretation and application of common ROE by all forces in the coalition.

ROE STANDARDIZATION:

ISSUE: Common rules of engagement (ROE) need to be developed and implemented by Joint and Coalition forces.

DISCUSSION: Developing and implementing common ROE for Joint and Coalition forces went well. The JTF clearly recognized the important role that ROE would play in Operation RESTORE HOPE.

The JTF used JCS and USCENTCOM Military Operations Peacetime Rules of Engagement, U.S. CENTCOM Reg 525-11, 25 Oct 89, and carefully tailored them based on operational and political needs into Serial One Supplemental ROE for Operation RESTORE HOPE. The underlying principle of self defense was used and additional ROE were developed to address necessary force requirements as they applied to the confiscation of weapons and disarmament of Somalis who posed a threat to U.S. forces or relief operations.

USCENTCOM developed a booklet, Proposed Coalition Military Operations Peacetime Rules of Engagement that included a verbatim copy of the U.S. Serial One Supplemental ROE and extracts from the CENTCOM Peacetime ROE. Coalition forces were given the booklet, briefed on the ROE, and asked to implement it.

Joint and Coalition forces implemented these common ROE with no significant problems. Often, units asked for clarification of specific rules. When necessary, the JTF developed command guidance to clarify gray areas. Implementation of common ROE by Coalition forces, while not a problem, did vary among them based on their command's emphasis of ROE, its training and experience in interacting with the local people, and differing interpretations of a graduated use of force.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Future Joint commanders develop ROE for humanitarian relief operations based on METT-T, to include any restrictions that fall between the established peacetime ROE and those ROE normally associated with hostilities (wartime). When necessary, establish command guidance to clarify ROE.

b. ROE continue to have command emphasis from Joint and Coalition commanders during future Joint/Coalition operations.

ROE TRAINING:

ISSUE: Individual soldiers need to understand and follow the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

DISCUSSION: As part of the ROE development process, it is very important that commanders have a clear mission statement before the ROE are drafted. The commander's intent and concept of the operation are critical elements in the formulation of ROE. Equally important is the need to write the ROE at a level understood by soldiers.

Implementing the ROE was enhanced by the development and use of a pocket-sized card that contained the ROE. This card (issued to soldiers) had the ROE written at a reading grade level commensurate with the soldiers who had to use it.

Pre-deployment training was also conducted for the division soldiers. Unit-level training programs were developed to prepare soldiers for situations they might encounter during this operation. The training program included not only classroom instruction but also ROE vignettes and situational training exercises. (Vignettes for ground forces and aircrews are attached following the recommendations.)

Although there seemed to be some disparity about whether all soldiers were issued ROE cards, it was apparent that they understood and followed the ROE. Command emphasis on ROE was high at all levels of command. Soldiers were able to apply restraint and use only the degree of force necessary to prevent (as much as possible) the loss of human life or serious injury.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Unit leaders continue to include ROE in pre-deployment training; use vignettes that promote discussion on specific details of how to apply ROE.

b. During contingency operations, develop and issue a card that outlines ROE to all soldiers that is simple, realistic, and easy to understand.

gjm/cwc 09/27/02